The King–Crane Commission Report new

1. The largest percentage for any one request is that of 1,500 petitions (80.4 per cent) for United Syria, including Cilicia, the Syrian Desert, and Palestine. The boundaries of this area are usually defined as “The Taurus Mountains on the north- the Euphrates and Khabur Rivers, and the line extending east of Abu Kamal to the east of Al Juf on the east; Rafa and the line running from Al Juf to the south of Akaba on the south, and the Mediterranean Sea on the West.” In addition to being the first plank of the Damascus program, a United Syria received strong support from many Christians in all the O. E. T. As., as the number of petitions indicates.

I. REPORT UPON SYRIA — THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE CLAIMS

I-A. The Area under British Occupation (O.E.T.A. South)

(See section III below for the Commission’s narrative and findings in the British-occupied zone: Palestine and southern Syria.)

I-B. The Area under French Occupation (O.E.T.A. West)

(See section IV below for the Commission’s narrative and findings in the French-occupied zone: coastal Syria and Lebanon.)

I-C. The Area under Arab Occupation (O.E.T.A. East)

(See section V below for the Commission’s narrative and findings in the Arab-occupied zone: Damascus and the interior of Syria.)

Cilicia

Treated as a special case (see VI). The Commission did not conduct exhaustive hearings there and did not regard it as central to the Syrian question; nevertheless, local claims and populations’ wishes are recorded.

Mesopotamia

Discussed separately (see VII). The Commission was unable to visit Mesopotamia; the report summarizes claims submitted to it.

II. SPECIFIC REQUESTS AS GIVEN IN THE TABLES

A — Territorial Limits

1. United Syria (largest single demand):
   • 1,500 petitions (80.4%) requested a United Syria, including Cilicia, the Syrian Desert, and Palestine. Typical boundary description: north — the Taurus Mountains; east — the Euphrates and Khabur Rivers with a line east of Abu Kamal to east of Al Juf; south — Rafa and the line from Al Juf to south of Akaba; west — the Mediterranean Sea.
   • These petitions reflect the first plank of the Damascus program and drew strong Christian as well as Muslim support across O.E.T.A. areas.
2. Opposition to Syrian Unity / Palestine:
   • Among pro-Zionist petitions, 6 of 19 asked explicitly for a separate Palestine (others implied separation).
   • Two Christian groups in Palestine sought a separate Palestine under British control, preferring that to a United Syria under the French.
3. Autonomous Palestine within Syria:
   • Twenty-four petitions, chiefly from Christian sources in southern O.E.T.A., requested an autonomous Palestine within the Syrian State; other delegations may have implied similar arrangements in their general independence demands.
4. Greater Lebanon:
   • 203 petitions (16.9%) asked for an independent Greater Lebanon; 196 of these came from Lebanon, and 139 were copies of the French-Lebanon program.
   • 1,062 protests were lodged against an independent Lebanon (including the Damascus program petitions and some Protestant/Christian sources in Lebanon).
5. Lebanese Delegations for Autonomy Within Syria:
   • Thirty-three Lebanese delegations (representing Muslims and Christians) asked to be autonomous within a Syrian State out of concern for Lebanon’s economic future under separation.
6. Bekaa Valley:
   • Usually considered part of Greater Lebanon, but 11 petitions specifically referenced its inclusion, while 8 asked that it remain part of the Damascus area.
7. Cilicia:
   • Although Cilicia was generally included in the 1,500 petitions for United Syria, two petitions specifically named it for inclusion, while three petitions requested Cilicia be given to an Armenian State.

B — Independence

1. Absolute Independence:
   • 1,370 petitions (73.5%) demanded absolute independence, the second main plank of the Damascus program and supported broadly by Muslim delegations.
   • The Commission notes that “absolute independence” was frequently paired with a request for a choice of mandate or for foreign assistance — i.e., many petitioners meant political independence while accepting technical or economic assistance (not colonizing control).
2. Independence for Iraq (Mesopotamia):
   • 1,278 petitions (68.5%) requested independence for Iraq/Mesopotamia.
   • 93 of 97 petitions asking for the independence of “all Arab countries” are related; in total 1,371 petitions sought independence and economic freedom for Iraq regions.

C — Form of Government

1. Constitutional, Decentralized Monarchy:
   • 1,107 petitions (59.3%) requested a “democratic, non-centralized, constitutional” kingdom — part of the Damascus program.
   • Almost all of these petitions (except five) asked that Emir Feisal be made king. The demand was especially strong in O.E.T.A. East (1,005 of 1,157 petitions requesting both a kingdom and Feisal as king).
   • O.E.T.A. South (Palestine) manifested less emphasis on a kingdom during the Commission’s presence.
2. Republican Government Requests:
   • 34 petitions (1.8%) — primarily Christian groups — asked for a democratic representative government of republican character, usually in opposition to a monarchy under Feisal.
3. Safeguarding Minorities:
   • 1,023 petitions (54.9%) requested adequate safeguards for minority rights — a request backed by broad cross-sectarian support, second only to anti-Zionism in unity.
4. Language and Capitulations:
   • Five petitions called for Arabic to be retained as official language (in opposition to Hebrew). Ten petitions asked the abolition of foreign capitulations (though the Turks had annulled them, the Powers had not sanctioned annulment).
5. Provincial Autonomy:
   • Nineteen petitions (1.02%) sought autonomy for all Syrian provinces, in addition to specific autonomy requests for Lebanon and Palestine.

D — Choice of Mandate

• The Commission grouped petitions into “first choice,” “second choice,” and “assistance” categories because many petitioners preferred assistance over a formal mandate, and some named a preferred nation only conditionally.

1. Britain:
   • 66 petitions (3.5%) selected Great Britain as first choice (48 of these from Palestine; 13 from Greek Orthodox delegations; 4 from Druses).
   • Britain’s second choice total (including requests for British assistance if America declined) was 1,073 (57.5%).
2. France:
   • 274 petitions (14.68%) selected France as first choice — most from the Lebanon district. Second-choice totals for France were very small.
3. United States / American Assistance:
   • 1,064 requests specifically asked for American “assistance” per the Damascus program; 57 explicitly named America as the mandatory power; 8 more accepted America only if a mandate were obligatory.
   • Combined “first choice” totals for America sum to 1,129 (60.5%). Second-choice totals for America were 11.
4. Reference to Syrian Congress:
   • 23 petitions (received at Jenin, Haifa, and Nazareth before adoption of the Damascus program) left the choice of mandate to the Syrian Congress — effectively adding 23 to the American-first / British-second tally.

E — Zionism

1. Pro-Zionist Petitions:
   • Some petitions favored Zionist proposals (studied elsewhere in the Commission’s analysis).
2. Anti-Zionist Protests:
   • 1,350 petitions (72.3%) protested Zionist claims and purposes — the third largest single subject of petitions and representing broad cross-sectarian opposition.
   • Opposition was especially pronounced in Palestine: 222 of 260 petitions (85.3%) in Palestine explicitly opposed the Zionist program.

III. THE AREA UNDER BRITISH OCCUPATION (O.E.T.A. SOUTH)

1. Narrative of the Commission’s Work

• The Commission arrived in Jaffa unexpectedly and conducted interviews and hearings with as many representative groups as possible. Because of the complex Christian denominational divisions (especially among Roman Catholics), the Commission necessarily gave disproportionate attention to many Christian sub-groups.
• A prepared statement of the Commission’s purposes was read to significant groups and given to the press. The team clarified repeatedly that the United States’ policy on mandates was undeveloped and that the Commission had no decision-making power.
• Automobiles were provided by the American Committee for Relief in the Near East to keep the Commission relatively independent. The Commission declined general social invitations and public demonstrations to remain impartial.
• The Commission visited two Jewish schools and dined at the Hichon-le-Sion colony, meeting leaders of Jewish colonies and the central Zionist Commission. A week was spent in Jerusalem with day visits to Bethlehem, Hebron, and Beersheba; subsequent rapid travel covered northern Palestine (Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Nazareth, Haifa, Acre).

2. The Attitude of the Occupying Government

• British officials — from Major General Sir Arthur Money downwards — were courteous, obliging, and helpful, bringing administrative experience (often from India, Egypt, or Sudan). They gave the impression of efficiency and a genuine attempt to administer for public good.
• General Allenby provided Lt. Col. J. K. Watson to accompany the Commission. Watson’s assistance greatly aided the Commission’s comfort, health, and investigative success.

3. Wishes of the People

• Muslims: About four-fifths of Palestine’s population (per a recent British census) were Muslims. They were nearly unanimous for United Syria and usually preferred self-government without a mandatory power; if a mandate were insisted, they tended to prefer the United States. At Jerusalem and elsewhere, the independence program and reference to the Damascus Congress were broadly affirmed. Some southern Muslims rejected any mandate outright. The Damascus Congress’ later adoption of American assistance (with Britain second and rejection of France) reflected the majority sentiment among Palestinian Muslims.
• Christians: Less than 10% of the population. Opinions varied:
  • Latin Catholics in Tiberias and Haifa, and most Christians of Nazareth, favored independence and reference to Damascus.
  • Maronites and Greek Catholics, and often Latin Catholics, favored a French mandate.
  • Greek Orthodox generally favored a British mandate.
  • Many Christians expressed they would prefer the United States if certain assurances were given. In general, Christians were more inclined toward a mandatory power providing real control.
• Jews: Slightly over 10% of the population, unanimously in favor of Zionism under a British mandate. Across Muslims and Christians, the majority strongly opposed Zionism; the question was tied closely to the broader demand for Syrian unity.

4. Zionism — Jewish Positions and Internal Variations

• Agreed elements among Jewish delegations:
  (a) A fairly large area of Palestine set aside immediately as a “national home” for the Jews.
  (b) Eventually political rule would become a “Jewish Commonwealth.”
  (c) Free immigration initially, unrestricted Jewish purchase of land, and recognition of Hebrew as an official language.
  (d) Great Britain to be the mandatory power protecting Jews and advancing the scheme.
  (e) The Great Powers had declared in favor of the plan and awaited execution.
• Internal differences in Zionist ranks concerned: (a) timing (immediate vs. delayed establishment), and (b) emphasis on restoration of traditional communal life vs. modern economic development (afforestation, electrification, resource utilization).

5. Custody of the Holy Places

• During Ottoman rule, the Sultan served as a practical guardian of comity among religions in Palestine; his removal necessitated a substitute to preserve the fragile status quo.
• If a purely Roman Catholic power received the mandate, the Commission feared upset to the existing balances (Catholics asserting special privileges at the expense of Greek Orthodox).
• The Commission suggested a permanent Commission for the Holy Places — headed perhaps by a Roman Catholic Custodian and containing representatives of Greek Orthodox Christianity, Protestant Christianity, Sunnite Islam, Shiite Islam, and Judaism — empowered to guard sacred places and adjudicate custody disputes, with a composition ensuring conservatism and harmony.

IV. THE AREA UNDER FRENCH OCCUPATION (O.E.T.A. WEST)

1. Commission Visits and Arrangements

• The Commission reached Beirut after visiting Palestine and the southern half of the Arab-occupied territory. Two days of interviews and automobile visits covered points from Tyre to Batroun; General Allenby loaned his yacht “Maid of Honor” to facilitate visits to Tripoli, Alexandretta, and Latakia. Delegations from across O.E.T.A. West reported to the Commission. French officials arranged hearings and provided hospitality and comfort.

2. Wishes of the People

• Generally, opinions aligned with those in Palestine and Damascus.
• Muslims: Largely favored American or British assistance per the Damascus program.
• Druzes: Favored an English mandate.
• Maronites and Catholics: Largely favored France.
• Greek Orthodox: Division appeared (not as uniformly pro-British as in Palestine).
• Ismailians: Mostly pro-France.
• Nusayriyeh (Alawites): Divided.
• Those favoring a French mandate held differing views on Lebanon’s relationship to Syria:
  • Some advocated complete political separation as an independent Greater Lebanon under France and sought French citizenship.
  • Others sought Syrian unity under a French mandate with expanded autonomy for the Lebanese district.
• In Lebanon proper, the majority likely sincerely favored a French rather than British mandate. Many in Lebanon, including Maronites, indicated a preference for the United States above other powers, attributing it to America’s unselfish wartime role and close ties with Lebanese who had lived in the U.S.
• Druzes requested exclusion from the Lebanon if it were assigned to France.
• Outside Lebanon proper (areas proposed for inclusion in “Greater Lebanon” such as Tyre, Sidon, “Hollow Syria” / the Bekaa, and Tripoli), a majority opposed French rule — Sunnite Muslims, most Shiites, some Greek Orthodox, and Protestants largely asked for America (with Britain second). In the remainder, unity with the interior of Syria was preferred over separation.

3. The Lebanon — Historical Note and Local Sentiment

• The 1861 arrangement placed the mountainous Lebanon under nominal multi-power protection with a Christian governor; the area’s predominantly Maronite and Roman Catholic population benefitted from comparatively rapid progress, infrastructure, tree planting, and stone houses. Wealth from Lebanese emigrants in America aided these improvements. Military service exemptions lowered taxes and made office-holding relatively more accessible to Christians.
• The French policy of colonization created an elite that considered itself culturally closer to France, and among them the idea of political separation and early French citizenship was strong. However, even pro-French elements often opposed annexation to France in principle (the official Maronite position).
• Any revision must preserve Lebanese security while raising the rest of Syria to comparable standards via adequate local autonomy. The Commission warned against leaving Lebanon in perpetual special privilege, burdening the rest of Syria.

V. THE AREA UNDER ARAB OCCUPATION (O.E.T.A. EAST)

1. Commission’s Stay in Damascus — Overview

• The Commission spent nine days in Damascus, conducting interviews with religious and political groups, governmental councils, and prominent persons, including Emir Feisal and General Allenby. Damascus received the most time since it would be the capital if United Syria were created. The Syrian Congress met during the Commission’s stay and presented its charter and program.
• Public display: bazaars displayed “We want absolute independence,” later removed by government order. The Commission’s interview with the Mufti and Ulema was widely published locally (not by commission authorization), stimulating public debate. The Commission accepted hospitality from Emir Feisal on two occasions.
• The Commission took a side trip to Amman and Deraa to consult populations on the desert edge. Moslem delegates uniformly demanded complete independence (no protection or mandatory power) but acknowledged the need for financial and economic advice — proposing to request advisers from America after recognition of independence. Arab orators appealed to America’s wartime role, asking the U.S. to uphold Arab independence at the Peace Conference.
• Christians in these areas were few and fearful; they generally desired strong mandatory protection, typically preferring British supervision and annexation to be governed with Palestine.
• After Damascus, the Commission visited Baalbek (Bekaa Valley), Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, hearing local delegations and visiting Armenian relief centers.
• Mesopotamia’s independence claim was also strongly presented in northern centers like Aleppo; some groups in Aleppo desired Syria’s boundary to extend eastward into the desert.

2. Attitude of the Occupying Arab Government

• The Arab government’s higher officials were mostly Syrian-born, often well-regarded for dignity and patriotism; many had administrative experience from the Turkish service or British administration in Egypt. Lower officials often continued from the Ottoman regime and were accused of continuing extortion and malversation.
• Local authorities made efforts to honor the Commission and to give apparent freedom of access and expression, though there were instances of ostentation and known attempts to influence impressions.

3. Wishes of the People in O.E.T.A. East

• Declarations from O.E.T.A. East showed more unanimity than those from South/West, conforming largely to the Syrian Congress resolutions (discussed below). The Damascus program represented a compromise among conflicting forces intended to present a united expression at the Peace Conference.
• General trends: almost unanimous desire for United Syria, full independence, rejection of French involvement, and opposition to Zionism.
• Moslems: nearly unanimous in requesting American assistance.
• Jews: asked for autonomy for themselves and supported Zionist schemes for Palestine.
• Druses: preferred an Arab Government under a British mandate.
• Christians: divided by sect and geography; most sought a strong mandatory control for protection.

4. The Syrian Congress at Damascus — Program (Adopted July 2, 1919)

• The Congress was not directly elected by a fresh popular vote; it was constituted from surviving electors of the prewar Turkish electoral system and their selected deputies. Critics argued the process was extra-constitutional and that Congress membership was not proportionate to population; nevertheless, the program is substantial and was presented to the American Section of the International Commission.

Program text (summary of its articles and emphases):

1. Complete political independence for Syria within the stated boundaries (Taurus north; Rafeh and a line from Al-Juf to south of the Mejazian line to Aqaba south; Euphrates and Khabur east with line east of Abu Kamal to east of Al-Juf; Mediterranean west).
2. Government form: a democratic civil constitutional Monarchy with broad decentralization and safeguards for minority rights; the King to be Emir Feisal who led the liberation struggle.
3. Protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which classed Syria among peoples “in the middle stage of development” in need of a mandatory power.
4. If the Peace Conference rejects independence, then any mandate should be economic and technical assistance only, not impairing complete independence; the people would look to the United States for such assistance (on the belief that the U.S. lacks colonial ambitions) — assistance to be limited to 20 years.
5. If America cannot accept, then Britain would be sought for assistance, provided it did not infringe Syria’s independence or unity and had the same time limit.
6. Rejection of French claims: The Congress did not acknowledge any French right over any part of Syria and refused French involvement in any circumstance.
7. Opposition to Zionist pretensions: The Congress opposed Zionist attempts to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria (Palestine), opposing Zionist migration to any part of Syria; Jewish compatriots in Syria were to enjoy equal rights and responsibilities.
8. Opposition to partition: No separation of Palestine or the littoral western zone (Lebanon) from Syria; unity of the country must be guaranteed against partition.
9. Complete independence for Mesopotamia (Iraq) and absence of economic barriers between Syria and Mesopotamia.
10. Protest against secret treaties that partition Syria or establish Zionism; demand for annulment of such conventions and agreements.

• The program concluded with an appeal to President Wilson and the Peace Conference to consider these national aspirations, asking to send a delegation to the Peace Conference to present and defend Syrian claims.
• The Commission described the program as the most substantial document presented, the result of an extensive political process, and a foundation for a Syrian national organization. It recommended that any mandatory power should be committed to liberal government principles to aid the new state’s beginnings.

VI. CILICIA (CILICIA)

1. General Observations

• The Commission did not undertake exhaustive hearings in Cilicia, considering it not strictly part of Syria and preferring to avoid opening the larger question of Turkish-speaking territories of the former Ottoman Empire.
• Population statistics varied, but the prewar Moslem majority in Cilicia was clear and probably larger after the war.

2. Wishes of the People (Summarized by group)

• Turks: desired retention of Turkish unity under the House of Osman and left the question of a mandatory power to Constantinople.
• Arabs (mostly Turkish-speaking; chiefly Nusayriyeh / Alawites): asked union with Syria under a French mandate.
• Armenians: requested union of Cilicia with Armenia under an American mandate.
• Other Christians (small minority): favored France, especially Greeks cooperating with French interests in northern Turkey.

VII. MESOPOTAMIA (MESOPOTAMIA)

1. Access and Limitations

• The Commission was unable to visit Mesopotamia. Claims were submitted at Damascus and Aleppo: complaints alleged British occupational restrictions on speech, movement, and political action, and fears of proposed immigration from India with adverse local effects.

2. Committee Program for Mesopotamia (Abstract)

Groups at Aleppo presented a program for Mesopotamia substantially parallel to the Damascus Program for Syria. Major points of their abstract included:

1. Complete independence for Mesopotamia, including Diarbekir, Deir-ez-Zor, Mosul, Baghdad, and Muhammerah.
2. A constitutional civil kingdom as the governmental form.
3. The king should be a son of the King of the Hejaz (either Abdullah or Zeid).
4. Opposition to Article 22 of the League’s Covenant placing them under mandatory supervision.
5. No outside government should interfere.
6. After independence, technical and economic assistance should be requested from America.
7. Objection to immigration, particularly from Hindus and Jews (the petition cited general objection to extensive external immigration).
8. Support for complete independence of Syria.
9. Objection to French interference in Syria.

• As typical of nascent nations, wide boundaries were claimed, creating potential difficulties with adjacent regions (e.g., Deir-ez-Zor with Syria; Diarbekir with Armenia; Muhammerah with Persia).

3. Religious and Ethnic Reports

• The Orthodox (Nestorian?) Syrian Patriarch from Der Zafran near Mardin informed the Commission that 90,000 of his people were slain in 1915; when British forces arrived in 1918 local submissions favored British rule, but subsequent emissaries from Constantinople fostered Kurdish and Arab independence agitation, worsening the situation. The Patriarch argued his people’s region should join Mesopotamia under an American or British mandate.

Conclusion — Final Observations and Recommendations

• The Commission presents full data to allow testing of inferences and to support its final recommendations to the Peace Conference. Recommendations were shaped using surveys and advisers’ reports, considering local, national, racial, and religious factors and practical policy needs for a just and durable peace.

Principal findings:

• Majority preference across petitions and district congresses favored United Syria with defined territorial claims and political independence.
• Independence was commonly coupled with a desire for technical/economic assistance rather than long-term colonial mandates; the United States was seen as the preferred source of such assistance, Britain as second choice, and France primarily favored by particular Christian communities (notably Maronites and other Catholics in Lebanon).
• Widespread opposition to Zionist aims existed among Muslim and Christian populations, especially in Palestine.
• The Syrian Congress’s program (Damascus, July 2, 1919) was a central, substantial, and organizationally significant expression of Syrian political will, deserving respect and careful weight in any international settlement.
• Careful institutional safeguards (minority rights, decentralization, and a neutral mechanism for the custody of Holy Places) were recommended as essential to stability.

Policy implication: Any international decision affecting Syria and neighboring regions must account for the expressed wishes of the local populations as presented, provide real guarantees against colonization in the name of mandates, and include measures to protect minority rights and religious sites. The Commission’s record is offered as a comprehensive factual basis for Peace Conference deliberations.