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Damascus and the SDF: Will the March 10 Deal Be Extended or Fail?

The March 10 deal between Syria and the SDF stalls as military integration disputes and Aleppo clashes threaten the looming 2025 deadline.

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As the 2025 deadline for the March 10 agreement draws closer, the landmark deal remains largely unfulfilled. Mohammad Kakhi, Amir Hakouk, Rakan al-Khadr, and Wasim al-Adawi report that neither the Syrian government nor the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have taken concrete steps toward implementation. Instead, recent months have been marked by a stalemate, with both parties trading blame for the ongoing delays and the lack of progress on the ground.

Stagnant Negotiations and Institutional Deadlock

Despite high-level diplomatic efforts, including a pivotal meeting on October 7 between the transitional President of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the commander of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, the agreement has failed to gain momentum. Key provisions, such as the integration of the SDF’s security and military wings into state structures and the handover of government institutions, remain stalled. “Neither side has implemented any of them,” the report notes, highlighting the lack of movement on core issues.

The situation has been further complicated by military friction. Violent encounters broke out in the Aleppo neighborhoods of al-Sheikh Maqsood and al-Ashrafiyah between the Syrian army and the Asayish (SDF-affiliated internal security). These clashes occurred despite an April agreement between Damascus and the SDF that specifically called for a cessation of hostilities in those areas.

Conflicting Military Integration Proposals

An anonymous source within the Ministry of Information told Enab Baladi that the Syrian Ministry of Defense recently offered the SDF an official roadmap. This proposal, which was also shared with American officials, suggested a gradual integration of the SDF into the Syrian national army while acknowledging its organizational structure. However, the SDF reportedly turned down this offer.

On December 22, the SDF presented its own alternative plan, which proposed the creation of three autonomous brigades: one for border security, one for counterterrorism, and one composed of female fighters. According to the government source, this counter-proposal suggests a desire for organizational independence that contradicts the spirit of the March 10 agreement. While the Syrian government is currently evaluating the proposal, any future meetings are expected to prioritize the original government plan over the SDF’s alternative.

Public Expectations and Potential Scenarios

Public sentiment regarding the deal’s future is largely pessimistic. A poll conducted by Enab Baladi between December 24 and 27, which included 770 participants, revealed that 41% of respondents expect a military escalation as the deadline nears. Meanwhile, 34% believe the timeline will be extended, and only 25% anticipate that implementation will actually begin.

Expert Analysis: Escalation or Realignment?

Experts suggest that if the March 10 agreement continues to stall, the risk of a security breakdown increases. Failure could lead Damascus to use military threats as leverage or provide an opening for Ankara to launch limited military operations if the integration process does not address Turkish security concerns regarding the SDF’s leadership.

Political analyst Anas Shawakh outlined three potential paths:

  • Full implementation by the end of 2025 (seen as nearly impossible).
  • A shift toward military escalation or conflict.
  • A “middle ground” involving partial implementation and a rescheduling of the agreement’s provisions within a new timeframe to manage disputes without open warfare.

In contrast, Tariq Hamo of the Kurdish Center for Studies expressed optimism. He argued that the SDF’s experienced fighters are a “national asset” for the Syrian state, especially in the ongoing fight against the Islamic State. Hamo warned that any breakdown in the agreement could allow extremist groups to regroup, particularly given the sensitive nature of prisons and displacement camps in the region.

The Role of International Mediators

The complexity of the situation was underscored by a high-profile meeting involving President Ahmed al-Sharaa, US envoy Thomas Barrack, and US Central Command commander Brad Cooper in Damascus on September 12, 2025. This was followed by a visit from Mazloum Abdi to the capital in October to address the Aleppo clashes.

Following these discussions, Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated on the social media platform X that he had met with Abdi and they “agreed to a ceasefire across all axes and military clash points in northern and northeastern Syria.” Despite these localized truces, the overarching political and military future of the region remains tied to the fate of the March 10 agreement as the end of 2025 approaches.

Damascus and the SDF: Will the March 10 Deal Be Extended or Fail?
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