In a significant shift in political tone, Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa has intensified his rhetoric against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). During a recent interview with the Kurdish outlet Shams TV, portions of which were broadcast by the state-run Syrian al-Ikhbariya, al-Sharaa moved beyond subtle hints to launch direct allegations against the group. He accused the SDF of being a tool of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and prioritizing an external agenda dictated by leadership in the Qandil Mountains over Syrian national interests.
Accusations of External Control
President al-Sharaa contended that the SDF is “pushing the Kurdish component into a narrow, factional armed party framework, with external ties and taking orders from the Qandil Mountains.” He further argued that the group’s actions run counter to international consensus, including the stance of the United States. According to al-Sharaa, even the U.S.—despite its support for the SDF—is currently pushing for the territorial integrity of Syria, aligning with the vision of US President Donald Trump.
Analysts speaking to Enab Baladi suggest this transition from insinuation to open accusation is a calculated effort to strip the SDF of its claim to national legitimacy. During the interview, al-Sharaa highlighted specific instances of external influence, noting that the military leader responsible for operations in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud and al-Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods had reportedly spent seven years in hiding within the Qandil Mountains. He also claimed that the natural resources from Syria’s eastern provinces are being diverted to the same foreign mountain stronghold.
Field Realities and Policy Shifts
Political researcher Nawar Shaaban observed that this change in rhetoric is rooted in recent military developments. He noted that the battle for Sheikh Maqsoud and al-Ashrafiyeh exposed internal confusion within the SDF and highlighted the presence of non-Syrian actors managing its operations. Shaaban told Enab Baladi that these violations of the ceasefire led the government to conclude that the SDF’s decision-making process is no longer national or consistent with Syrian sovereignty. This framing serves to explain the breakdown of previous negotiations, which collapsed despite several attempts to maintain a track of dialogue.
Decree No. 13: A Move Toward Kurdish Integration
Parallel to his criticism of the SDF, President Ahmed al-Sharaa has taken legislative steps to address long-standing Kurdish grievances. On 16 January, he enacted Decree No. 13 of 2026, which grants Syrian citizenship to all residents of Kurdish descent, including those previously categorized as “unregistered” (maktoumei al-qayd). This landmark decree effectively nullifies the exceptional measures and laws that originated from the 1962 al-Hasakah census.
The new legislation introduces several cultural and social changes:
- Kurdish is officially recognized as a national language.
- Public and private schools in areas with significant Kurdish populations may now teach the language as part of optional or cultural curricula.
- Nowruz, celebrated on 21 March, is established as a national holiday representing fraternity and spring.
Under this decree, the Syrian state pledges to safeguard linguistic and cultural diversity, ensuring that Kurdish citizens can develop their mother tongue and preserve their heritage within the bounds of national sovereignty. Furthermore, the decree mandates that state media and educational bodies adopt inclusive language, legally prohibiting ethnic or linguistic discrimination and prescribing punishments for those inciting ethnic tension.
Strategically Separating Kurds from the SDF
The President’s political strategy appears aimed at driving a wedge between the Kurdish population and the SDF leadership. During his Shams TV appearance, al-Sharaa repeatedly asserted that the SDF “steals” the decision-making power of the Kurds rather than representing them. He stated:
“The Kurdish component took part with us in the revolution, and there is a Kurdish component within the revolution, but it does not belong to the SDF. I do not believe in the theory that the Kurdish component is represented by the SDF, and there are also internal divisions within the Kurdish component, and they are not in agreement with the SDF’s approach.”
Political analyst Ayman Dasouki interprets these messages as a strategic effort to reassert state control. By addressing Kurdish rights directly through Decree 13, the government seeks to dismantle the SDF’s narrative of being the sole protector of Syrian Kurds. Dasouki noted that this approach characterizes any future military action not as an attack on Kurds, but as a move against a specific faction that seeks to monopolize the Kurdish cause for external goals.
Varied Reactions to the Government’s Initiatives
The reception of these measures has been polarized. Nawar Shaaban highlighted a massive “media war,” noting that while SDF-affiliated entities attacked Decree 13, there were notable celebrations in Kurdish neighborhoods such as Rukn al-Din in Damascus, as well as in Aleppo and Afrin. He argued that Kurds outside of SDF-controlled zones welcomed the decree because it fulfills aspirations held since Syria’s independence in the 1940s.
Conversely, the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria responded with skepticism. While acknowledging the decree as a possible first step, the administration stated it fails to meet the broader democratic hopes of the Syrian people. They argued that rights should be anchored in a permanent constitution rather than “temporary decrees” and called for the creation of a pluralistic, democratic framework that reflects the will of all Syrian components.
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