1. News
  2. Politics
  3. Damascus and the SDF: Will the March 10 Deal Be Rescheduled?

Damascus and the SDF: Will the March 10 Deal Be Rescheduled?

0
Share

Share This Post

or copy the link

As the deadline at the end of 2025 approaches, the landmark March 10 agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remains largely a dead letter. Despite the looming expiration date, neither party has moved to enact its core provisions, leading to a cycle of mutual recrimination regarding ongoing delays and the lack of tangible steps to bridge the divide.

A Stalled Integration Process

High-level diplomacy, including a notable summit on 7 October between Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, has failed to break the deadlock. The transition of state institutions and the absorption of SDF military and security apparatuses into the national framework remain unfulfilled. This political paralysis has been punctuated by violence, specifically in Aleppo’s al-Ashrafiyah and al-Sheikh Maqsood districts. There, the SDF-linked Internal Security Forces (Asayish) clashed with the Syrian army, undermining a cessation of hostilities clause signed in April.

Competing Military Proposals

An anonymous source within the Ministry of Information disclosed to Enab Baladi that the Syrian Ministry of Defense recently floated a plan for the SDF’s gradual incorporation into the state military structure, a move shared with American officials. However, on 22 December, the SDF countered with its own vision. Their proposal suggests the creation of three distinct, autonomous brigades focused on counterterrorism, border security, and women’s units. Damascus views this as an attempt by the SDF to preserve its independence, which they argue violates the spirit of the March 10 accord. The government is currently evaluating this counter-proposal alongside other related issues.

Public Opinion and the Threat of Escalation

Amidst this uncertainty, Enab Baladi conducted a digital survey from 24 to 27 December involving 770 participants. The results highlight a skeptical public: 41% of respondents anticipate a military confrontation, while 34% believe the agreement’s timeframe will be extended. Only 25% hold the view that implementation will actually commence before the end of 2025.

Experts suggest that if the deadlock persists, the risk of a security flare-up increases. Damascus could use the threat of force as leverage, or Ankara might launch limited military incursions if it perceives the integration process as failing to dismantle the SDF’s leadership. While a ministry source indicated that military action is not the only alternative, the rhetoric has certainly sharpened in recent weeks.

Analytical Scenarios: War or New Deadlines?

Political researcher Anas Shawakh identifies three potential paths. He considers total implementation by the end of 2025 to be nearly impossible. While the military option is gaining traction in official discourse, Shawakh believes it is hampered by international and regional pressures for stability. Consequently, he views the third scenario—partial implementation alongside a rescheduled roadmap—as the most probable outcome to avoid open conflict.

Conversely, Tariq Hamo of the Kurdish Center for Studies remains more optimistic, dismissing the idea of the agreement’s total failure. He argues that the SDF’s tens of thousands of battle-hardened troops are a “national asset” for the Syrian state, particularly in the ongoing fight against the Islamic State. Hamo warned that any breakdown in cooperation could allow extremist groups to regroup, especially around sensitive prison and camp sites. He anticipates new announcements might surface before 2025 ends, potentially addressing Turkish concerns and other pending files through a Syrian-Syrian political environment.

Diplomatic Interventions and Ceasefires

The diplomatic landscape involves significant US participation. During a session in Damascus on 12 September 2025, President Ahmed al-Sharaa met with US envoy Thomas Barrack and US Central Command commander Brad Cooper. Following clashes in October, SDF leader Mazloum Abdi traveled to the capital to meet with al-Sharaa in the presence of Barrack and Cooper. Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra later confirmed via X that he had met with Mazloum Abdi and they agreed to a comprehensive ceasefire across all military clash points in northern and northeastern Syria.

Damascus and the SDF: Will the March 10 Deal Be Rescheduled?
+ -

Comments are closed.

Follow Us